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1 INTRODUCTION 
Only 'employees' within the legislative definition stand to benefit from the 
protective provisions or labour legislation relating to unfair dismissal, un~ 
fair labour practices, unfair discrimina(ion, minimum conditions of em~ 
ployment elc. MOSl employers are therefore aware of the imponance of 
disLinguishing between employees and other lypes of workers. 
Section 213' of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides that an 
'employee' is: 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any re-
rnuneration~ and 
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting 
the business of an employer. 
Despite its seemingly wide reach, the courts have held that (he essential 
distinction to be made in terms of this definition is between employees 
and so-called independent contractors. The prevailing test to discern em-
ployees from independent contractors is (he 'dominant impression' test, 
which requires an adjudicator to weigh all the relevant factors' in a par-
ticular case in order (0 decide whether her dominant impression of [he 
parties' relationship is of one between employer and employee or be-
tween employer and independent contractor. ~ 
* ! wuuld like lU thank Graham Giles and -!ashia Jithoo t'or their helptul comments on 
earlier drafls ot [his paper 
I :'ee abo ss 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment ACI 75 ot" 1997. Employment 
EqlJity Act 55 of 1998, and lhe Skills Development Au 97 of 199H 
2 Ttlese would includ/\ inter alia, wlwther tlw worker is subjeu lo lite corurol of the 
employer. works regular hours, is a member ot" the employer's medical aid or pension 
ScilClllt:S, uses the employcr's eqUipment in the performance of her duties. works solely 
fur the empluyer and pays employees' [ax. 
3 The dorninant irnpre~sion test has been subjected 10 <-:I great deal of criticism. See 
Mureinik 'The contract ot" service: an /~asy tcst for h<-:lrd CilS/~S> (1 9HO) 97 SAL) 246; 
Bra::.sey 'The nature of (~Illployment' ([ (90) II f~J 889; Benjamin 'An <-:Icciclenl of his-










































LAW; DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
In 2000 the legislature identified 'two categories of workers who do not 
receive the protection of labour law -
(a) those who fall within the definition of an employee but who are in 
practice unable to assert their rights as employees; 
(b) those who the courts classify as independent contractors but are never-
theless in a position of dependence on the organisations or the per~ 
sons to whom they provide services'.~ 
In order to address this problem. the Labour Relations Act and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act were (somewhat paradoxically') amended in 
2002 to introduce a rebuttable presumption of employment.' It provides 
that, regardless of the form of the contract, a worker is presumed to be an 
employee where one of seven factors is present in a work relationship; le-
• the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direc~ 
(ion of another person; 
• the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
• in the case of a person who works for an organisation. the person 
forms part of that organisation; 
• the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 
40 hours per momh over the last three months; 
• the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom 
he or she works or renders services; 
• the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the 
other person; or 
• the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
The presumption will not apply to those who earn more than a certain 
amount per annum.7 and NEDLAC is to bring out guidelines for determining 
4 ExplanatDry Memorandum to the Basic Conditions or Employment Amendment Bill 
2000 in Government Gazette 21407 of 17 July 2000. Theron 'The erosion of workers' 
rights and the presump(ion as to who is an employee' (2002) £> Law, Democracy and 
Development 27 at 28 comments cogently that 'the reasons for the regime's inability or 
failure to protect these two categories of workers, as sel out in the memorandum, are 
cryptic if not contradictory. The first category comprises unprotected employees. The 
examples given in the memorandum are those engaged in part-time work, homework 
or casual work. It is said that the courts regard these persons (referred LO as 'vulnerable 
workers') as employees. At the same time it is said that the courts undermine the effec-
tiveness of the protection legislation provides Lhese workers. There is no indication 
given as to which proteC(ions are referred to or, given that Lhese workers are regarded 
as employees, why this is so', 
5 See the discussion in Theron 'The erosion of workers' rights and the presumption as ro 
who is an employee' supra esp at 28-29. 
£> S 200A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and s 83A of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
7 S 200A(2). The amount is currently set at RI15 572 per annum. See GN 356 in Govern~ 
ment (iazeUe 25012 of 14 March 2003. For the purposes of thaL notice: "'earnings" 
means gross pay before deduction ie income tax, pension, medical and similar pay-
rnents but excluding similar payments (contributions) made by the employer in respect 










































DF.FlNING THE PARAMETERS OF EMPLOYMENT 
whether persons, including those who earn in excess of the relevant 
amount, are employees.~ 
It is noteworthy that the introduction of the presumption does nothing 
more than shift the onus of proof jf it finds application." In determining 
whether a worker is an employee arbiters will still have regard to the domi-
nant impression test. The scope of application of labour legislation has 
ostensibly not been broadened. I would, however, suggest that the legisla, 
ture's recognition of economic dependence as a factor relevant to the 
inquiry into employment status might go some way (0 changing the 
outcomes of such inquiries. That is a factor which has not traditionally 
been considered by the couns in deciding the employee/independent 
contractor question. 
Given that the nature of work relationships has changed dramatically in 
recent years';) it has become more difficult for the courts to determine 
which workers are employees and which are independent contractors, 
especially considering that they have traditionally been conservative in 
their approach (0 that issue. II The purpose of this article is to consider a 
question that has arisen in recent case law: ie, in deciding whether a 
worker is an ·employee', what significance should be attached (0 the fact 
that that worker has a shareholding or a member's interest in the com-
pany or close corporation (eC) for which she works?I.' Can that worker be 
regarded as an 'employee' of the company or CC when she is in effect 
'pan' of the employer and thus apparemly running the business for her own 
account - and, depending on the size of her shareholding or interest, might 
be in a pOSition to dictate her own terms and conditions of employment 
and prevent diSCiplinary action against her as well as her own dismissal? 
In that regard it is worth noting that the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the Labour Appeal Court have repeatedly emphasised that one of the 
primary distinctions between an employment relationship and that of an 
independent contractor is that: 
ltJhe employee is subordinate to the will of the employer. He is obliged to obey 
the lawful commands, orders or instructIOns of the employer who has the right 
of supervising and coorrolling him by prescribing to him what work he has to 
do as well as (he manner in which il has 1O be done 
8 At Ih(: tllne or writing [hose guidelines h;':I(j no[ yet been pruduced 
9 Where the presumption is not applicable file onus is on [he ilpplJCan( worker [0 prove 
(hat she is an 'employee' Where (he preSlllllp[ion is applicable, tile onus shitrs to rhe 
ernployer (() rebut (he prcslHTlp(ion by proving rl1<:1( (he relevant worker is no( an em-
ployee. The applicant will. ot" course. have 10 presem phma facie evidence 'hil( one of 
[he t"acrors mentioned in s 200A or s 83A is presefH in (he work n:i<:llionship 
10 Sec Thompson 'The chilnging na(llre of elTlploynwru· (20031 24 IL) 1793 and Theron 
'Ernployrnent is no( whil[ it used 10 be' (2003) 24 IL) 1247 
I I Brassey Employment and tab(Jur I.aw B:iii 
12 While direClors could also tw considered pdn of 1 he conrrolhng bean and mind of a 
company ilnd thus no( employees, the couns have long been prepared to accep( that 
directors may be employees for (he purposes of lilbour legislation. Sec /.ony & Another v 
Chemical Specialists Tvl (Pry) Ud 1987 (El) II) 521 (Ie); Oak Indus/rie,)" SA (PlY) Ltd v)ohn 
NO & Another 19H7 (El) II} 756 (N), Whitctlf[ v Computer Diagnostics and Engineering (Pry) 
LId 1987 (81 I~J 35h (IC) and rno<;( recen(ly PG Group (pry) Ud v Mbambo NO & Others, 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The independent contractor, however, is notionally on a footing of equality 
with the employer, He is bound to produce jn terms of his contract of work, not 
by the orders of the employer. He is not under the supervision or control of the 
employer. Nor is he under any obligation to obey any orders of the employer in 
regard to the manner in which the work is to be performed. The independent 
contractor is his own master." 
The courts have held that, while this factor is not the sole indicator of the 
existence of an employmem relationship, it remains an important indica-
tion of such a relationship.14 It is a consideration that becomes particularly 
relevant when the worker is effectively in a position where she dictates or 
might dictate the manner in which the organisation operates and to a 
certain extent controls her own destiny within an organisation. Such 
circumstances arise where a worl ... er has a shareholding in a company or 
interest in a close corporation 
2 THE TRIUMPH OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE 
In Johnson v Piccollo Mama CC" the applicant worked as the manager of a 
restaurant owned by a cc. When the CC decided to close down the res-
taurant, the applicant approached the members of the CC with a business 
proposal for the establishment of a late night bar in the same premises. 
The applicant obtained a 25 % Interest in the CC with an agreement that 
he would actively participate in the carrying on of the business of the CC, 
being responSible for the daily running of the business. At a members' 
meeting a decision was taken to terminate the applicant's relationship 
with the cc. The applicant had allegedly been negligent, had failed to 
make certain imponant adminisua[jve arrangements and had gone 
overseas without prior consen( or discussion wi£h the other members of 
the cc. The applicant felt aggrieved by this decision and approached the 
CCMA claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed. The commissioner 
was required to decide a preliminary point as to whether the applicant 
was an employee of the CC when his relationship with it was terminated. 
To the commissioner's mind the question to be decided was 'not whether 
[the applicant] was an independent contractor Rather the question 
[wasl whether [he] was an employee or a member of a close corporation 
working for "himself"'," The commissioner distinguished the case before 
11 SABC \I McKenzie (1999) 20 IL} 585 (LAC) a( 591 
14 [n Smu v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (I) SA 51 (Al at 62D Joubert JA 
was of the view that the presence of the employer's right of supervision and control 
over an employee is 'indeed one of the most important indicia that a particular contract 
is in all probability a contraCl of service' and in Uberty Life Association of lifrica Lcd v 
Niselow (1996) 17 IL] 673 (LAC) at 682 Nugent JA felt that 'control is not essential, in my 
view it is at least of such "prime importance" .. (hat its absence should cast serious 
doubt upon whether the relanonship is one of employment. lis presence, on the other 
hand, is by no means a sure sign [hat the relationship is one of employment·. See also 
Niselow v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1998) 19 IL] 752 {SCA} at 756 and Han-
nah \I Government of the Republic of Namlbw (2000) 21 iL] 2748 (LCN) at 2751 
15 (2001) 221LJ759 (((MA). 










































DFFINING THE PARAMF.TEKS OF EMPLOYMENT 
her from that in Oosthuizen v CAN Mining and Engineering Supplies eeli on 
the basis that in the latter case Oosthuizen had been an employee with 
one organisalion and little changed when he moved across to work for the 
ce, except his acquisition or the interest in the cc. That had been found 
insufficicm to alter the naLUre of the parUes' relationship. In the Piccollo 
Mama case, in the commissioner's view, something did happen to alter 
the nature of the parties' relationship - the initial business (the restaurant) 
had closed down and the applicant had seized the opportunity rOT another 
business, got the consent of the members of the CC and acquired an 
interest in the cc. The result, in the commissioner's view, was that 'the 
relationship changed from that of employer~employee to that of members 
in a close corporation, in reality, "co-owners" of the business', I~ 
There is, with respect, no real distinction between the two cases. In both 
cases a worker who was an employee with one organisation acquired an 
interest in the CC for which he worked, and in each case there was very 
little dHlerence in the manner in which he worked from one organisation 
to the next. The factors to which the comm issioner referred did not weigh 
particularly strongly against Johnson being viewed as an employee. It is 
beyond the scope of this piece to analyse each of the factors highlighted 
by the commissioner. Suffice (Q say that the impression that one is left 
with after a survey of the relevant factors is that Mr Johnson was dlec~ 
tively in the position of a managerial employee. He received a salary and 
the other members of the CC exercised control over him. They took 
operational decisions which he had LO implement and, despite his being 
allowed to control the daily running of the business, were effectively in a 
position to take punitive action should they be dissatisfied with his per-
formance. Their ability to 'punish' Johnson is evident in the fact that when 
they were dissatisfied with his performance they 'dismissed' him. The 
extent of the other members' control over Mr Johnson is also illustrated in 
that he apparently needed their permiSSion to take leave (despi(e his 
sentiments to the contrary). His failure to consult with the other members 
or get permiSSion to take leave was one of the grounds for the termination 
of his relationship with the Cc. 
The factor that appeared to weigh most heavily with the commissioner 
was the fact (hat Johnson was a member of the CC and stood LO share in 
the profits generated by the business as a result of his management thereof. 
He was found not to be an employee assisting in the business of his 
employer, but rather part of the employer by virtue of his member's 
interest in the CC and the nature of the relationship 
As indicated by the commissioner in the Johnson case, in cases where a 
worker has a shareholding or interest in the business for which she works, 
the inquiry can be directed at establishing whether she is about the em-
ployer's business or her own.IO Another related, and more traditional, ilne 
J 7 (1999) 20 ILJ 9 J 0 (LC) This decisi[]n is disDl!>sed rnore flllly below 
18 At 765 
19 This is by n[] means a novel idea, as is eVident from tlte words or' Schreiner JA in R v 
AMCA Services Ltd &. Al10ther 1959 (-1) SA 208 (AI ar 213H wlwre the learned judge said 










































~I\W. DEMOCRACY Ii. DEVEWPMENT 
of inquiry might focus on the extent to which the employer exercises con-
trol over the worker. The greater the worker's comrol over his own des~ 
tiny the less likely (and necessary. it is submitted) that the court will 
consider him an employee. 
In Blismas v Dardagan~U Dardagan was contracted to work as the man~ 
ager and controller of a business owned by Blismas. The net profits made 
from the business were to be shared equally between the parties. It was a 
provision of (he contract that B would not interfere with the running of (he 
business except. where necessary. in an advisory capacity. His right of 
control over D was thus contractually excluded. In seeking to ascertain the 
nature of the relationship between the parties the court was of the view 
that 'litJ is the essence of a contract of master and servant that the ser~ 
vant should submit to the direction of his employer and obey his em-
ployer's instructions not only in the things he has to do but as to the time 
and manner in which he has to do them. (See Colonial Mutual Life Assur-
ance Society v MacDonald 1931 AD 412 at 435)'" The clause in the 
agreement prohibiting B from interfering in the running of the business 
was seen as quite inconsistent with a contract of master and servant. 
Rather. the contract was a contract of the hire of D's services and fell 
within the class of contract known as locatio conductio operis (independent 
contractor) as opposed to locatio conductio operarum (employee). 
Granted. this decision was handed down in the era when control was 
still viewed as the most important indicator of employment. and it does 
not deal with a case where the worker stood to share in the profits of the 
business with a member'S interest or shareholding. However, it leaves the 
impression that where a worker controls his own fate and stands to 
benefit directly from the performance of the business. he will not be 
viewed as an employee of that organisation. 
In light of the above decisions. and returning to the issue of employee 
shareholding. it would appear difficult to argue that the holder of a contral-
ling (ie majority) interest or shareholding is an employee of the organisa-
tion for which she works. She appears to be the master of her own 
destiny and can apparently not be compelled to do anything in the or-
ganisation as she can block any decision with which she does not agree. 
Nor can she be dismissed,"' unless she votes in favour of her own dis-
missal, in which case there is no 'dismissal' at all. This removes two basic 
elements of an employment relationship and raises serious doubts regard-
ing the need for labour legislation to apply to such a person. However. as 
will emerge from the discussion below. the controlling shareholder is not 
always in a pOSition (Q dictate her own workplace destiny. 
20 195111)SA 140 (SR) 
21 At! 46 
22 The power (0 dismiss was considered a very important indicalOr of employment by 
Satchwell JA in Board of Exewtors Ltd v McCqUerty (1997) 18 IL) 949 (LAC) where [he 
court was called upon (0 decide who was the employer of an employee. In the learned 
judge's view, 'assumption of the rigtu to terminate employment and the exercise of 
such power is a distinguishing feature if not a specification of an employer [and thus an 










































DEFINING Tf IE PARAMETERS 0(-' EMPLOYrv1ENT 
In the United Kingdom the courts came 'very near to asserting the exist~ 
ence of a rule of law jf they did nOl quite reach that poinr~3 that a control-
ling shareholder cannot be an employee. 
In Buchan Ii< lvey v Secretary oj State Jor Employment" Mr Buchan was 
the director of a firm in which he had a 50 % shareholding and worked for 
the company full~time as a scanner operator and sales manager. He spent 
only about 5 % of his time in the role of director. received a salary with 
deductions for PAYE and gO[ 5 weeks leave per annum. Mr Ivey owned 
99 % of the shares in the company of which he was a managing director. 
He received a salary, pension benefits, worked a 44~hour week and was 
granted 22 days' holiday per annum. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
found thal the tribunal a quo had been entitled to find that Mr Buchan and 
Mr Ivey were, due to their shareholding, not employees but running their 
own businesses through the medium of limited companies, not subject to 
the control of the boards of directors of those companies. 
3 SUBSTANCE PREVAILING OVER fORM 
It is problematic to take the view that controlling shareholders or mem-
ber's interest holders are not employees because of that holding. The 
effect of such a view is effectively to add a requirement to the definition 
of 'employee' that the worker also not be a majority shareholder. A major, 
ity shareholder could thus, depending on other relevant facrors, change 
his status from non~employee to employee by divesting himself of some 
of his shareholding. Similarly, an employee stands to forfeit his employ, 
ment status should he, for example, inherit or purchase a controlling 
shareholding in the business for which he works.)<' It is also possible that 
the controlling shareholder may have entered into an agreement to vote 
his share in accordance with the dictates of a third party. Does char mean 
that he is then an employee because he apparently no longer has control 
over his destiny? It should also nO[ be forgotten [hat the shareholder might 
in reality have no role in [he running of the company and is (hus nO[ 
exercising any control in that sense They do not generally have a right to 
interfere with the decisions of management. unless by means of resolutions 
passed in general meetings - and by (he time those come around the 
dismissal or other prejudicial event may long have come and gone.~t The 
shareholder in question may not have rights of such a kind that he is 
answerable only to himself and capable of being dismissed. In addition, 
he may not be permitted to vote on matters in which he has a personal 
interest; eg the termination of his contract of employment.?7 
23 Lord Coulsfield in Fleming v Secrewry oj Siale for Trade and Induslry 1997 IRLR 682 
(Court of ScsskHl) at 684 commenLing on [he deciSIon of [he Employmenc Appeal Tri-
bunal in Buchan &.. Ivey v Secrewry oj Slate Jor Employmenl J 997 1 RLR 80 (EAT). 
24 Above. 
25 See the comments of the Employmenl Appeal Tribunal in Secrelary oj State v Bol/rill 
1998 ICH. 564 (EAT) at 57 J 572. 
26 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hollrill 1999 ICR 592 (CA) aL 602. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY 15< DEVELOPMENT 
It is also noteworthy that in the insolvency context it is the Jiquida(Of of 
the business. and not its shareholders, that is in control of the business 
and thus in a position (0 dismiss workers. There is therefore much to be 
said for adopting an holistic view of a work relationship and deciding 
whether a worker is an employee based on a proper conspectus of all the 
relevant factors. 
In Oosthuizen v CAN Mining and Engineering Supplies CC" the applicant 
(while employed by another company) had paid a close corporation 
R 150 000, a fifth of its capital. The applicant came to work for the CC and 
was registered as a member thereof a few months later. The staff of the 
CC were informed that the applicant was an 'owner' of the CC and one of 
the employers at the cc. The relationship between the applicant and the 
close corporation was terminated and the applicant went to the Labour 
Court claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed. It fell to be deter-
mined whether the applicant had been an employee of the cc. 
Grogan AJ stated at the outset that 'the mere fact that an employee 
holds shares in the company or an interest in the [close] corporation by 
which he is employed does not per se exclude him from the statutory 
definition of employee' " The court acknowledged that there are relation-
ships, like partnerships, in terms of which a person works for or with 
another person, that would not be classifiable as employment relation-
ships. Those relationships are distinguished from employment relation-
ships by an application of the dominant impression test, and in casu the 
court formed the dominant impression that the applicant was an em· 
ployee of the respondent Cc. 
The Labour Court painted out in Rumbles v Kwa Bat Marketing (Pty) Ltd'o 
that '[sJharing in the profits and losses of a business would, in the normal 
course, be a significant factor indicating a relationship other than one of 
employment'. But, as the court went on to note, it is not a conclusive factor. 
There is no reason why a worker cannot be 'part of the employer' by 
having an interest or shareholding in the company or close corporation 
for which she works and simultaneously be viewed as an 'employee', 
provided that the other factors in the relationship would support such a 
conclusion. 
This view finds considerable support in the decisions of the appellate courts 
in the United Kingdom. In Fleming v Secretary oj Stale Jar Trade and Indus-
try}] {he Scottish Coun of Session 32 was confronted with a situation similar 
to that in Buchan. Mr Fleming was the managing director of a company in 
which he held 65 % of the shares. He worked alongside the other employees 
28 Supra. 
29 At q 13. This approach was adopted in Bas v Ps!mark (Pty) Ltd & Another L200! I 6 BALH 
559 (CCMA) where {he commissioner found that a shareholder and direclOr was not an 
employee based on the application of the dominant impression test. 
30 (200'3) 24 llJ ! 587 (LC) at 1594 
3 I Supra. 
32 This court has a status in Scotland equivalent [Q that of the Co un of Appeal in England 










































DEFINING TI [E PARAMETERS or EMPLOYMENT 
for [he same number of hours. He received a salary subjec[ [0 PAYE. The 
company found itself in financial difficulty and was later put into liquida~ 
lion. All the employees (including a director with a 35% shareholdingl 
received redundancy and statutory notice pay. Mr Fleming's applicatIon 
for such payments was refused by the Secretary of Stare for Trade and 
Industry as he was not considered to be an employee of the company. 
The industrial tribunal agreed. The court was of the view that there was 
more than enough material in the circumstances of the case to justify the 
industrial tribunal's decision that Fleming was not an employee. Important 
were the facts that he ga ve a personal guarantee for loans to (he company 
and had chosen not to draw his salary when the company first got into 
difficulties. Mr Fleming's shareholding in the company was treated as a 
relevant, but nO( determinative, factor. 
In the court's view: 
[wle do not see how it can be doubted that the fact that a person IS a share" 
holder IS a relevant factor. The Significance of that factor will depend on the 
circumstances, and the weight to be given it may vary with [he size of [he 
shareholding . The decision as to whether a person is or is not an employee 
must, however, be taken on aJJ [he relevant factors at the material time. The 
shareholding position must, in our view, be a relevant factor. It will, however, 
usually only be one of a number of such factors, and it is not impossible that 
regard might be had to the way in which the person in question comes to be a 
shareholder, or to be a majority shareholder. As in any such decision, all the 
circumstances have to be considered." 
This approach was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Secretary 
oj State Jar Trade and Industry v Bottril(l where the court was confromed 
with the issue of whether the sale shareholder of a company who had 
entered into a contract of employment with the company, worked fixed 
hours, was gramed sick leave and was paid a salary from which deduc~ 
tions for PAYE were made could he regarded as an employee. The court, 
per Lord Woolf MR. found thaI the industrial tribunal had not erred in 
finding that Mr Bottrill was an employee for the purposes of claiming a 
statutory redundancy payment." WhJle reluctant to lay down ngid guide-
lines, the court stated that in situations such as this' 
33 At 68-1 
3-1 Supra. See also rhe more f{'CC!il deCision of (hal court iTI Sf;'/{ar., I1rf'n(1.w'ene Ltd v 
Connolly 2001 IRLR 222 (CAl. In thaL case lhe applicanl had been Ihe majority share-
holder irl a company. E Ltd, of which A Ltd was a ~lIbsidiary cHid SUbs(!qlJ(!nlly the em-
ployer. The applicarl( was managing director of both companies. Ttw applicant had 
been dismissed following the acquisition of rht' two companies Ily a holding COlTlpany. 
but [he tribunal had no jurisdiction 10 entertain his application IIriless his (~mploym(~nr 
had begun befure the acquisirion. The coure held that a cOfl[rIllling s/li'lrcholding ill a 
company, although significant, was not a determinative faclor wht'n considering 
whelher (I shareholder or director of a company was an employee 
3S For (In Hltcn~~(irlg example of the applicatiun of the principk~s espollsed by tile Coun of 
App(!al in Bo((ril/ s(~e the deci~ion of tile Nonhern Irelarld Industrial Tribunal in Fitzger-
ald & AnO(her v IJfparlmenl Jor Employment and Learning (Statlls 0/ Applicants) 2002 NJIT 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
[t]he first question which the tribunal is likely to wish to consider is whether 
there is or has been a genuine contract between the company and the share-
holder. In this context how and for what reasons the concract came in(Q exis-
tence (for example whether the comrac[ waS made a( a time when insolvency 
loomed) and what each party actually did pursuant CO the contract are likely to 
be re[evam considerations. 
If the tribunal concludes that [he contract is not a sham, it is likely to wish co 
consider next whether the contract, which may well have been labelled a con-
tract of employment, actually gave rise to an employer/employee relationship. 
In this context, of the various faccors usually regarded as relevant the de-
gree of control exercised over the shareholder employee is always important. 
This is not the same question as that relating to whether there is a controlling 
shareholding. The tribunal may think it appropriate to consider whether there 
are directors other than or in addition to the shareholder employee and 
whether the constitution of the company gives that shareholder rights such that 
he is in reality answerable only to himself and incapable of being dismissed. It 
may be relevant to consider whether he is able under the articles of association 
to vote on matters in which he is personally interested, such as the termination 
of his contract of employment. Again, the actual conduct of the parties pursu-
ant to the terms of the contract is likely to be relevant. It is for [he tribunal as 
an industrial jury to take all relevant factors into account in reaching its conclu-
sion, giving such weight to them as it considers appropriate."· 
4 CONCLUSION 
From the above survey of decisions by the South African and United King-
dom courts it is apparent that a worker'S shareholding or interest in an 
employer may count against that person being viewed as an employee. 
However, the mere fact that the worker has such a shareholding or inter-
est, even a controlling shareholding or interest, should not be considered 
sufficient in itself to preclude that person being viewed as an 'employee' 
for the purposes of the application and protection of labour legislation. 
This question is going to become increasingly important in light of black 
economic empowerment initiatives. There is a drive to empower workers 
by way of increasing their shareholding in companies or interests in close 
corporations. 
The question to be answered in each case is whether labour legislation 
should find application to particular kinds of workers. It has been force-
fully argued that it should apply to workers who are dependent on their 
employers and thus vulnerable to exploitation. It is inherent in labour law 
to protect the vulnerable worker and ensuring their protection and. in 
light of section 23 of the Constitution, is now a constitutional imperative. 37 
In 2002 the legislature signalled that economic dependence is important 
in assessing whether a worker is an 'employee'. The entrepreneur busi-
ness-owner pursuing his own ends in the commercial world is clearly not 
the intended target of labour law. A distinction must therefore be drawn 
16 A similar approach was suggested by [he Labour Court in Building Bargaimng CounCil 
(Southern and Eastern Cape) v Melmon·s Cabinets CC &. An()ther (2001) 22 IIJ 120 (LC). 










































DEFINING THE PARAMF.TF.HS OF EMPLOYMENT 
between, on the one hand. those who are in business for their own ac-
count and who dictate their own course and, on (he O(her hand, those 
who (in the context of their work) are controlled by others and obliged to 
render personal services [0 one entity only. Only the lauer should be 
covered by labour legislation. 
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